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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Ballard v. Comm'r, 125 S. Ct. 1270 (2005).
LAW: The Tax Court must include fact-finding reports in the appellate
record that are submitted by Special Trial Judges.
FACTS: Petitioners were taxpayers charged with tax fraud and failure
to report certain payments on their individual tax returns. They filed
petitions for re-determination in the Tax Court, where the Chief Judge
assigned the consolidated cases to a Special Trial Judge. After trial, the
Special Trial Judge submitted to the Chief Judge a report made pursuant
to Tax Court Rule 183(b), which included findings of fact and opinion.
The Chief Judge then assigned the case to a Tax Court Judge for review
of the trial judge's report and an ultimate decision. The Tax Court
Judge found that the taxpayers acted with intent to deceive the
Commissioner, and held them liable for underpaid taxes and substantial
fraud penalties. He issued an opinion that adopted the Special Trial
Judge's opinion, but the Rule 183(b) report was withheld from the
public and the appellate record. Based on conversations among one of
the taxpayers' attorneys and two Tax Court judges, petitioners believed
the decision was not a true reproduction of the trial judge's report. The
taxpayers filed motions seeking access to the initial report, which the
Tax Court denied. On two separate appeals, the Eleventh Circuit and
Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's denials.
ANALYSIS: After a 1983 amendment of Rule 183, the Tax Court
adopted the practice of treating a trial judge's report as an in-house draft
to be worked over collaboratively by the regular Tax Court Judge and
the Special Trial Judge. There is, however, no statutory provision for
such a collaborative process. The Tax Court must follow the
requirements from Rule 183, which call for a Tax Court Judge to give
"due regard" to the trial judge's opinion and presume the fact-findings
to be correct in deciding whether to reject or modify the Rule 183(b)
report.
The report should be included as part of the record to allow for a
fully informed appellate review. It is well understood that a judge who
hears a case at trial has a comprehensive view of the case that cannot be
conveyed by a paper record. Further, it is routine in federal judicial and
administrative decision-making to disclose a hearing officer's initial
report and to make that report part of the appellate record.
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HOLDING: The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits' judgments are
reversed.
IMPACT: The Tax Court must place a trial judge's report in the
record. This practice takes away wide discretion from the Tax Court
Judge in forming the ultimate decision in a case heard by another judge.
However, it will allow for a thorough review to determine whether a
Tax Court Judge gave proper deference to a trial judge's findings.
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005).
LAW: Enforcement of a restraining order is not a property interest
protected by procedural due process.
FACTS: Jessica Gonzales had a restraining order against her estranged
husband. When she noticed her children were missing one evening, she
suspected that her husband had them in violation of the restraining
order. Despite her repeated phone calls to the local police department in
Colorado, the police took no affirmative action. More than four hours
after her first call to the police, Gonzales went to her husband's
apartment. Finding no one there, she called the police again and was
told that an officer would arrive. When no one came, she went to the
police station and submitted an incident report. The officer who took the
report, however, allegedly made no effort to enforce the restraining
order or to locate the children. Later that night, Gonzales' husband
walked into the police station, opened fire, and was shot by police.
Inside his car, the police found the children's dead bodies.
On the basis of these allegations, Gonzales brought suit claiming
that the town violated her due process rights by failing to respond
properly to her complaints. The district court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss, concluding that Gonzales' complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. The Tenth Circuit reversed,
finding that Colorado law entitled her to enforcement of the restraining
order.
ANALYSIS: To hold a property interest in a benefit, a person must
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to that benefit. Such entitlements
are created by existing rules from an independent source, such as state
law. A benefit is not a protected entitlement if officials have discretion
to grant or deny it. The Colorado statute does not appear to mandate
enforcement of restraining orders. The statute merely states that officers
must use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order. The
statute directs that officers may arrest or seek a warrant, which leaves
room for an officer's discretion to determine whether the violation's
circumstances or competing duties compel enforcement in a particular
instance. The practical necessity for discretion is particularly apparent
in a case such as this where the suspected violator is not actually present
and his whereabouts are unknown. In such circumstances, the statute
does not appear to require officers to arrest the suspect, but only to seek
a warrant. That, however, would entitle the person only to the warrant
procedure, which cannot be the basis for a property interest.
Even if the statute could be said to make enforcement
mandatory, that would not necessarily mean that Gonzales has an
entitlement to enforcement. Her alleged interest stems from a state
statutory scheme. The statute, while giving her power to initiate
contempt proceedings, is completely silent about any power to request
or demand that an arrest be made.
Further, even if the Court thought Colorado created such an
entitlement, it is not clear that an individual entitlement to enforcement
of a restraining order could constitute a "property" interest for due
process purposes. Such a right would have no ascertainable monetary
value and would arise incidentally, not out of a government benefit or
service, but out of a function that police officers have always performed:
arresting people when they have probable cause.
HOLDING: The Tenth Circuit's judgment is reversed.
IMPACT: Colorado law enforcement officers maintain their discretion
in enforcing restraining orders. Colorado's procedural obligations
imposed on state officials with respect to restraining orders do not create
property interests for the protected persons.
Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S.
Ct. 2688 (2005).
LAW: Where a statute is ambiguous on the point at issue and an
agency's corresponding interpretation is reasonable, federal courts must
defer to the agency's statutory interpretation.
FACTS: The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued a
declaratory ruling that cable companies providing cable modem services
were not telecommunications carriers due to the integrated nature of
such access and the high-speed wire used to provide it. Instead, they
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were classified as information-service providers that manipulated and
stored information. As such, these cable companies were exempt from
mandatory regulation under Title II of the Communications Act.
Numerous parties petitioned for judicial review. The Ninth Circuit used
stare decisis as a basis for vacating the rule in part.
ANALYSIS: The Chevron framework requires that a federal court
defer to an agency's statutory interpretation. This applies if the
particular statute is within the agency's jurisdiction to administer, the
statute is ambiguous on the point at issue, and the agency's construction
is reasonable. After concluding that the ruling was within the FCC's
jurisdiction, the Court examined whether the point at issue was
ambiguous and whether the agency's construction was reasonable.
A court's prior construction of a statute trumps an agency's
construction that is otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the
prior court decision bases its construction on the unambiguous terms of
the statute and leaves no room for agency discretion. The prior
interpretation that the Ninth Circuit relied on only held that the best
reading of the statute was that cable modem service was a
telecommunication service, not that this was the only permissible
reading or that the Communications Act unambiguously required it.
Where a statute's plain terms could be interpreted as more than
one reasonably ordinary usage, the FCC's choice of usage is entitled to
deference. In determining whether cable companies providing cable
modem service "offer" telecommunications within the meaning of the
statute, the FCC used the ordinary meaning of "offering." It is common
to describe what a company "offers" to a consumer as what the
consumer perceives to be the integrated finished product. Cable
companies providing cable modem service "offer" clients finished
Internet service, an information service.
The FCC's interpretation is reasonable since it is not overly
broad. It does not allow any communications provider to evade
common-carrier regulation simply by bundling information service with
telecommunications. Rather, the information service must not be
separable from the service's data-processing capabilities. Further, the
FCC concluded that broadband services should exist in a minimal
regulatory environment that promotes investment and innovation in a
competitive market.
Thus, the FCC's conclusion is a lawful construction of the
Communications Act under Chevron and is not an arbitrary and
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capricious deviation from agency policy under the Administrative
Procedure Act.
HOLDING: The Ninth Circuit's judgment is reversed and remanded.
IMPACT: Cable companies that provide cable modem service are
exempt from mandatory regulation under Title II of the
Communications Act.
Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. Ct. 1230 (2005).
LAW: Alleged former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spies are
prohibited from bringing suit against the United States government
based on covert espionage agreements.
FACTS: Respondents, husband and wife, were former Cold War spies
in their home country; at the time, it was an enemy of the United States.
In exchange for lifetime financial and personal security, provided by the
CIA, the couple agreed to perform espionage services. After years of
service, the couple defeuted and became United States citizens. The
husband found a job in the state of Washington; as his salary increased,
the CIA decreased his benefits. Eventually, the parties agreed to
discontinue the CIA assistance. After a corporate merger, the husband
was laid off. The couple sought a return to financial assistance from the
CIA, but was denied. The couple brought suit alleging that the CIA
violated their equal protection and due process rights. The district court
denied the government's motion to dismiss, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.
ANALYSIS: Judicial review is precluded in cases where success
depends on the existence of a secret espionage relationship with the
government. The longstanding rule announced by the Court in Totten v.
United States prohibiting suits against the government based on covert
espionage agreements categorically bars the alleged spies' claims.
HOLDING: The Ninth Circuit's judgment is reversed.
IMPACT: Alleged former CIA agents have no cause of action against
the government since any suit would risk revealing classified
government information. This opinion prevents individual lawsuits
brought to induce the CIA to settle a case out of fear that litigation
would reveal classified information that might undermine covert
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
operations. The holding also eliminates the need for the CIA to invoke
the "state secrets" privilege on a case-by-case basis, which may risk the
perception that it is either confirming or denying a relationship with
individual plaintiffs.
Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005).
LAW: Inmates have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding assignment to the state's highest maximum-security prison.
Informal, non-adversary procedures for assignment to these prisons
afford adequate due process where the state's interest outweighs the
inmate's interest, and the risk of an erroneous placement is minimized
by the procedures.
FACTS: "Supermax" prisons are maximum-security prisons with
highly restrictive conditions that house the most dangerous prisoners. In
1998, Ohio opened its first and only Supermax prison, the Ohio State
Penitentiary (OSP). Current and former OSP inmates alleged that the
informal, non-adversary procedures for assignment to OSP violated their
due process rights. The district court found that inmates have a liberty
interest in avoiding assignment to OSP, and Ohio had denied the
inmates adequate due process. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
ANALYSIS: OSP's harsh conditions as a whole impose an atypical
and significant hardship that is sufficient to create a liberty interest for
the inmates in avoiding assignment to OSP. Having established a liberty
interest, the Court next determined what due process was due by
considering three factors: (1) the affected private interest; (2) the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards, and; (3) the government's interest. First, an inmate's
interest in avoiding erroneous placement at OSP is less than significant
since he or she is already lawfully confined; meanwhile, Ohio's interest
remains significant. Ohio's first obligation is to ensure the safety of
other inmates and prison personnel. Ohio's interest also addresses the
problem of scarce resources. Second, Ohio provides multiple levels of
review for any decision recommending OSP placement and a placement
review within 30 days of an inmate's initial assignment to OSP. These
procedural safeguards are sufficient protection to comply with due
process requirements. Courts must give substantial deference to prison
25-2
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management, which has more experience with such procedures before
mandating additional elaborate procedural safeguards.
HOLDING: The Sixth Circuit's judgment is affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded.
IMPACT: This decision gives state prison officials great deference in
prison management decisions when the interests of safety and scarce
resources are at stake. Absent a showing that informal, non-adversary
procedures for assignment were ignored, it is likely that these
procedures will be upheld.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND CIRCUIT
Lin v. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005).
LAW: Statutory construction of the Immigration and Naturalization
Act (INA) set forth in a summarily affirmed immigration judge's
opinion is not entitled to Chevron deference.
FACTS: Shi Liang Lin, Xian Zou, and Zhen Hua Dong each sought
asylum in the United States under the INA. As a basis for such a grant,
Lin and Zou separately claimed that they suffered persecution in China
when their girlfriends were forced to have abortions. Dong's claim was
similar to Lin's and Zou's, except that Dong sought asylum in
connection with the persecution of his fiancee. Dong further claimed
that family planning officials threatened to sterilize him if his fiancee
became pregnant again. When his fiancee became pregnant a second
time, Dong fled, but his fiancee was forced to have another abortion.
The immigration judge in each case denied the applications, refusing to
expand a 1997 decision which held that forced abortion of one spouse
was an act of persecution against the other spouse, to include unmarried
couples. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) summarily affirmed
the immigration judges' decisions in each case.
ANALYSIS: Before reviewing the BIA's decision, the court first
addressed the appropriate standard of review. An agency interpretation
qualifies for Chevron deference if it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
Fall 2005
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promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Here, Congress delegated
the authority to make immigration rules carrying the force of law to the
Attorney General. There are no rules or regulations indicating that the
Attorney General ever intended to delegate similar rulemaking authority
to the immigration judges. Absent the power to issue binding decisions,
immigration judges cannot, themselves, be said to possess the requisite
ability to issue, on behalf of the Attorney General, a rule carrying the
force of the law. Even so, a summarily affirmed immigration judge's
decision is not a rule promulgated by the BIA on behalf of the Attorney
General. The fact that the BIA deems an immigration judge's decision
to be a final agency determination does not transform the immigration
judge's legal construction into a BIA rule carrying the force of law. The
BIA's streamlining regulations expressly provide that when the BIA
summarily affirms an immigration judge's decision, the BIA approves
only the result reached in the decision below without providing any way
of knowing that the BIA has, in fact, adopted the immigration judge's
particular construction of a statute when the court is asked to assess its
reasonableness. In any event, agency practice suggests that neither the
BIA, nor the immigration judges, treat summary affirmances as binding.
Accordingly, the immigration judge's decision is not entitled to Chevron
deference.
The court did not consider whether the decisions were entitled to
Skidmore deference because, in the 1997 decision, the BIA failed to
articulate a reasoned basis for making spouses eligible for asylum. The
court also did not review de novo whether to affirm or reverse the results
reached in these cases for the same reason.
HOLDING: The cases were remanded so that the BIA could more
precisely explain its rationale behind the 1997 interpretation and clarify
whether, when, and why boyfriends and fianc~s may or may not
similarly qualify as refugees. The panel retained jurisdiction to rule on
these cases and decide the issues on appeal after the disposition of the
remand.
IMPACT: Future agency interpretations of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act are not entitled to Chevron deference, but they might
be afforded Skidmore deference.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stock2rowers of
Am. v. Dep't of A2ric., 415 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005).
LAW: A reviewing court must give deference to the agency's findings
related to a final rule.
FACTS: The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) bars
the importation of beef from countries where Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE), more popularly known as mad cow disease, is
known to exist. In a final rule, the USDA relaxed this practice by
allowing beef imports from Canada although two cases of BSE had been
found in Canada at the time. The USDA's basis was that resumption of
beef imports from Canada would not significantly increase the risk of
BSE to the American population. The Ranchers Cattlemen Action
Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of America sued the USDA to block
the implementation of the final rule. The district court issued a
preliminary injunction finding, among other things, that the rule was
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
ANALYSIS: An agency's actions violate the APA's arbitrary and
capricious standard if the agency did not consider the relevant factors
and did not articulate a rational connection between the facts found and
the choices made. Rather than evaluating the final rule, the district court
repeatedly substituted its judgment for the agency's, even though the
record supported the USDA's conclusion.
The district court's lack of deference may have been due to its
misreading of the Animal Health Protection Act. The district court
appears to have imposed a requirement on the USDA that its final rule
present no additional risk to human or animal health. The AHPA's
terms, however, indicate congressional intent to give the Secretary of
Agriculture wide discretion in dealing with the importation of plant and
animal products. The AHPA imposes no requirement on the USDA that
all of its actions carry no associated increased risk of disease.
Further, the court's own review concluded that the Secretary had
a firm basis for its conclusion. The court then went on to examine the
likelihood of success on the merits of other several other claims.
HOLDING: The district court's grant of a preliminary injunction is
reversed.
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IMPACT: This decision limits a reviewing court's ability to analyze
whether an agency's rule is arbitrary and capricious. Rather than
substituting its own judgment for the agency's, reviewing courts must
examine the record and defer to the agency's judgment and expertise.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Schiavo v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
LAW: A court-appointed guardian and hospital do not violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act when they terminate care of an
incapacitated patient. A patient's due process rights are not violated if
the proper standard of review is applied, and there is no authority to
support violation of a substantive due process right.
FACTS: As the court-appointed guardian for his incapacitated wife,
Michael Schiavo caused the termination of care for Theresa Schiavo.
Theresa's parents filed a five-count complaint against Michael and the
hospital that terminated care. Based on those claims, the parents
brought a motion seeking a temporary restraining order to require
Michael to resume Theresa's care. The district court denied the motion,
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Theresa's parents amended the initial
compliant by adding five more counts. The district court again denied
the parents' motion.
ANALYSIS: Michael Schiavo does not qualify as a "public entity" or a
place of "public accommodation" as required to bring a claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. The hospital is also not a "public
entity." Even assuming that it is a place of "public accommodation,"
Theresa's parents failed to make a substantial showing that the hospital
removed nutrition and hydration and withheld medication from Theresa
on the basis of her disability rather than pursuant to a court order.
The parents assert that this is also a procedural due process
claim and that the Due Process Clause requires that decisions to
terminate care must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that
the incapacitated person would have made the same decision. However,
the Supreme Court has previously held that states may use this clear and
convincing evidence standard before termination of care, but are not
required to do so. Nonetheless, the state court did apply the clear and
convincing evidence standard and found that it was met. Procedural due
process does not guarantee a particular result. Additionally, no
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procedural due process claim exists because due process has been
provided in abundance, as evidenced by the twenty-one different
proceedings in this case. There are few cases that have ever been given
as much due process.
The parents further assert that this is also a substantive due
process claim. The Court has specifically held that the substantive due
process component of the Due Process Clause does not require a state to
protect its citizens against injury by non-state actors. Neither Michael
Schiavo nor the hospital is a state actor for this purpose just as neither is
a "public entit[y]" or a place of "public accommodation."
The court also found that the parents had no claim under the
Rehabilitation Act or the Eighth Amendment.
HOLDING: The district court's denial of the temporary restraining
order is affirmed.
IMPACT: Future claims against a hospital that terminates care and the
guardian who causes the termination cannot be brought under the
Americans with Disabilities Act or the substantive component of the
Due Process Clause. Procedural due process may still be the basis for a
valid claim in termination of care cases.
CALIFORNIA STATE COURT
McClung v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 99 P.3d 1015 (Cal. 2004).
LAW: The California Fair Employment and Housing Act imposes
personal liability on non-supervisory co-workers as well as supervisory
workers. This provision does not apply retroactively to conduct
predating its 2000 enactment.
FACTS: In 1999, the California Supreme Court interpreted the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act as imposing no personal
liability on non-supervisory co-workers. The state legislature amended
the provision in 2000 to include non-supervisory co-workers as
personally liable. In 1998, Leslie Ann McClung filed a complaint
against the Employment Development Department (EDD) and her non-
supervisory co-worker Manuel Lopez, alleging claims of hostile work
environment and failure to remedy a hostile work environment under the
Act. The superior court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The court of appeal affirmed as to the EDD but reversed as to Lopez,
Fall 2005
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finding that the amendment merely clarified the meaning of the prior
statute and legislative intent was to apply the new law retroactively to all
existing cases.
ANALYSIS: The court's earlier interpretation of the Act was final and
conclusive in not imposing personal liability on a non-supervisory co-
worker. The legislature enacts laws while the judicial branch interprets
those laws. The legislature may define the meaning of statutory
language by legislative enactment that it may deem retroactive, but it
has no power to say what it meant by the prior language. The
amendment here did not state that it declared existing law. Rather than
merely clarifying the prior statute, the legislature changed it. Any
statements in the legislative history to the effect that the proposed
amendment would only clarify the law's original meaning may have
been intended only to demonstrate that the clarification was necessary
and not as positive assertions that the law always provided for co-
worker liability. Accordingly, the 2000 change does not apply
retroactively to conduct predating its enactment, such as Lopez's
actions. Thus, the Act imposes no personal liability on Lopez.
HOLDING: The court of appeals' judgment as to the non-supervisory
co-worker is reversed and remanded.
IMPACT: There is a strong presumption against statutory retroactivity
overcome only by express language of and clear legislative intent for
retroactivity. If legislatures intend to clarify a statute rather than change
it, they must do so by retroactive legislative enactment. Otherwise, any
such interpretation will be deemed non-binding.
Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 239 (Ct. App.
2005).
LAW: A trial court may use evidence that was not before the Insurance
Commissioner in ruling on extrinsic issues such as procedural fairness
and thoroughness, but in evaluating the Commissioner's ruling on the
merits of the claim, the trial court may only consider evidence that was
actually before the Commissioner.
FACTS: Two former employees of Golden Eagle Insurance Company
filed claims against the company during its conservatorship proceedings
to recover for a number of torts. After investigation, John Garamendi,
California's Insurance Commissioner, rejected the claims as factually
and legally unfounded. The Commissioner issued boilerplate notices to
the claimants, which did not explain the bases of the rejections. In an
order to show cause proceeding brought in trial court to review the
Commissioner's rejections, the claimants submitted a substantial amount
of evidence that the Commissioner had not previously considered. The
trial court refused to consider this evidence but offered to send the
matter back to the Commissioner for consideration in light of the
additional evidence. When the claimants declined the opportunity, the
trial court ruled that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion
based on the evidence before him at the time the determinations were
made.
ANALYSIS: The Commissioner's determination of claims resembles
an adjudication. The trial court's statutory role is solely one of review.
While the trial court may accept and consider evidence that was not
before the Commissioner in reviewing the rejection of a claim, the court
may consider that evidence solely to rule on issues other than the merits
of the claim such as the thoroughness of the Commissioner's
investigation or the Commissioner's unjustified failure to consider
relevant evidence. Allowing the trial court to second-guess the
Commissioner's judgment on the basis of evidence that was not before
the Commissioner would undercut the legislature's assignment of
primary responsibility for determination of claims since parties would
hold critical evidence from the Commissioner in favor of a hearing in
the trial court. Allowing the trial court to base its review on extrinsic
evidence would be inconsistent with the abuse of discretion standard,
since any judgment of the reasonableness of the Commissioner's
exercise of discretion in adjudicating a claim necessarily must be based
on the evidence on which the Commissioner actually based his decision.
After the court determined that the trial court cannot consider evidence
not before the Commissioner on his ruling, it examined the merits of
each of the claims.
HOLDING: The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
IMPACT: This was a matter of first impression in this jurisdiction. In
matters of reviewing administrative proceedings on the issues of fairness
and thoroughness, the trial court may exercise its independent judgment
in evaluating extrinsic evidence rather than deferring to the agency's
weighing of evidence. In matters of reviewing administrative
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proceedings on the merits of the claims, the trial court may not consider
supplemental evidence proffered by the claimants.
NEW YORK STATE COURT
New York Times Co. v. N.Y. Fire Dep't, 829 N.E.2d 266 (N.Y. 2005).
LAW: Records requested under the Freedom of Information Law are
subject to exceptions such as the privacy, law enforcement, and intra-
agency exceptions. Surviving relatives have an interest in keeping
private the affairs of the dead.
FACTS: Four months after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on
the World Trade Center, a New York Times reporter requested various
records from the New York City Fire Department (FDNY). The FDNY
denied the majority of those requests. The newspaper and reporter
brought suit to compel disclosure of tapes and transcripts of (1) calls
made on 9/11 to the FDNY's 911 emergency service, (2) dispatch calls
made on 9/11 on the FDNY's internal communications, and (3) oral
histories consisting of interviews with firefighters in the days following
9/11. The New York supreme court ordered disclosure restricted by
certain redactions. The appellate division affirmed, except that it
ordered the personal expression of feelings in the oral histories
disclosed. Plaintiffs appealed seeking disclosure of all materials they
had originally requested.
ANALYSIS: The Freedom of Information Law requires state and
municipal agencies to make all records available for public inspection
and copying. The FDNY relied on three exceptions to that rule. It
contended that (a) the privacy exception applied to the disputed portions
of the 911 calls, (b) the intra-agency exception applied to the disputed
portions of the dispatch calls, (c) both the privacy and intra-agency
exceptions applied to the oral histories, and (d) the law enforcement
exception applied to six records that were possible exhibits in the
impending federal criminal trial of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was
alleged to have had a role in the 9/11 attacks.
Privacy extends to the dead, and their survivors have an interest
in keeping private the affairs of the dead. The privacy interests in this
case are compelling as many of the calls express the terror and agony
the callers felt and their deepest feelings about what their lives and their
families meant to them. It is likely that these tapes, if disclosed
publicly, will be replayed and republished endlessly, and in some cases
they will be exploited by the media as sensational news. This is the sort
of invasion that the privacy exception exists to prevent. While there is a
public interest in the disclosure of the 911 calls, it is outweighed by the
privacy interests of those family members who wish to keep the callers'
words private. Thus, the 911 calls that family members prefer to keep
private constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
The dispatch calls are communications within the FDNY that are
intra-agency materials and are protected from disclosure unless they are
statistical or factual tabulations or data and for staff instructions that
affect the public. Thus, the dispatch calls should be disclosed to the
extent they consist of factual statements or instructions affecting the
public, but they should be redacted to eliminate non-factual material.
Oral histories are spoken words recorded for the benefit of posterity, and
people interviewed for these histories understood or reasonably should
have understood that the words spoken were destined for public
disclosure. The record even shows that the FDNY intended them to be
publicly disclosed. Thus, the oral histories are not protected from
disclosure by either the privacy or the intra-agency exception. All of the
oral histories are discloseable except for specifically identifiable
portions that can be shown likely to cause serious pain or
embarrassment to an interviewee.
The issue as to the six unidentified tapes and/or transcripts that
the Department of Justice said it would use in evidence at the Moussaoui
trial is whether they were compiled for law enforcement purposes and
whether their disclosures would either interfere with law enforcement
investigations or judicial proceedings or would deprive a person of a
right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication. In terms of an impartial
jury, potential jurists in the Moussaoui trial are already exposed to an
enormous amount of publicly available information related to 9/11; they
will be exposed to the materials at trial whether or not they are made
public before the trial. The court is, however, mindful of the enormous
importance of public interest of an orderly and fair trial for Massaoui.
There may be some good reason not apparent from the record before the
court why the disclosure of these materials would create problems in the
criminal case. Thus, the Department of Justice must be given a chance
to demonstrate that disclosure of the six potential exhibits would
interfere with the Moussaoui case.
HOLDING: The appellate division's judgment is affirmed as modified.
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IMPACT: This decision protects vital personal interests while allowing
reasonable disclosure to satisfy the public interest.
